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owned enterprises (Brandt and Li, 2003; Cull and Xu, 2005; Sun et al., 2005). Relative to state-owned enter-
prises, the ﬁnancial resources obtained by non-state-owned enterprises do not support the value created or
“ownership determinism” theory. However, Fang (2010) implies that the ﬁnancial discrimination that non-
state-owned enterprises suﬀer is more likely to be due to their own strategy decisions or “corporate decisions”
theory.
However, due to the mandatory change in China’s ﬁnancial market, commercial banks and borrowers have
long been active participants in the market and thus research on credit resource allocation should pay more
attention to the rent-seeking of banks that originates from their monopoly. Xue and Zhu (2010) ﬁnd that the
ﬁnancial reform at the end of 2003 did not aﬀect property rights arrangements, nor did it change banks’ fore-
casts of soft budget constraints, as borrowers’ debt maturity choices depend on banks’ rent-seeking character-
istics. This paper takes ownership into account and studies whether state-owned enterprises and non-state-
owned enterprises had diﬀerent credit sources during the process of institutional change, whether banks’
rent-seeking aﬀects the loan allocation structure and whether the banking system reform has promoted the
marketization of credit resource allocation.
We investigate credit allocation eﬃciency before and after the 2003 banking system reform and ﬁnd that
since the banking system reform, the role of earnings quality has been enhanced in the credit market and
the relationships between earnings quality and new short-term loans, long-term loans and total loans have
changed signiﬁcantly in listed companies, especially in state-owned listed companies. Further research implies
that due to the inﬂuence of rent-seeking (Xue and Zhu, 2010), commercial banks have loosened the earnings
requirements of non-state-owned listed companies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and hypoth-
eses. Section 3 covers the data, variables and descriptive analysis. Section 4 provides the empirical methodol-
ogy and presents the empirical ﬁndings and robustness tests, and Section 5 concludes.2. Related literature and hypotheses
2.1. Impact of soft budget constraints and banks’ rent-seeking on credit allocation
When legal systems are weak, government regulation and ﬁnancial intervention may be external constraints
to running ﬁnancial markets in emerging economies. Due to socialist governments’ “father complex” toward
state-owned enterprises (Kornai, 1980; Kornai et al., 2003) and government compensation for policy loss dur-
ing transition periods (Lin et al., 1994/1999, 1997, 2004), governments tend to relax ﬁnancial discipline and
soften budget constraints (Kornai, 1980). When state-owned commercial banks themselves beneﬁt from soft
budget constraints and expect the government to redeem them, they will inevitably weaken its oversight role.
Further, the increased government-backed interest may result in bankruptcy, harm owners’ beneﬁts and gen-
erate enormous social costs (Akerlof and Romer, 1993). This in turn leads to more widespread soft budget
constraints (Berglof and Roland, 1995). Gao and Schaﬀer (1998) ﬁnd that in transition countries, soft budget
constraints give unproﬁtable enterprises access to bank credit more easily, thus the resource allocation eﬃ-
ciency of the banking system is lower. Studies on China’s ﬁnancial market show that ownership and political
relations are important in giving enterprises access to long-term loans, with state-owned enterprises receiving
more long-term loans at lower credit standards (Sun et al., 2005; Jiang and Li, 2006; Zhang et al., 2010).
Before the banking system reform, a dual soft budget constraints mechanism2 substituted for a creditor
protection mechanism, which to a certain extent reduced the commercial banks’ losses but caused state-owned1 In contrast to non-equilibrium credit rationing, equilibrium credit rationing is due to information asymmetry or customer relationships
(Jaﬀee and Russell, 1976; Williamson, 1986).
2 Soft budget constraints contain at least two subjects: the constrained object and the supporter (Kornai et al., 2003). Constrained
objects are limited by their own resources. If they make a loss, then they will not survive without external aid. Supporters are controlled by
government and can transfer resources to aid troubled ﬁrms. After January 1, 1985, China’s commercial banks replaced ﬁscal
appropriation and became supporters of soft budget constraints, whereas the Central Bank became the supporter of the commercial banks
and an eventual lender to state-owned enterprises and banks, creating a dual soft budget constraint.
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mixed property rights between state-owned commercial banks and state-owned listed enterprises induced some
state-owned enterprises to regard credit loans from state-owned commercial banks as “free capital.” Once they
obtained such loans, diversion and embezzlement were inevitable.3 At the same time, state-owned commercial
banks that had a monopoly over ﬁnancial resources inevitably sought rent, which resulted in a large number of
“relation-loans” or “corruption-loans” and eventually produced a large amount of non-performing loans that
had to be borne by the government. Negotiation between banks and enterprises led not only to “state-owned
enterprise escape,” but also to “non-state-owned enterprise escape.” In the long run, state-owned commercial
banks’ exclusive monopoly over ﬁnancial resources caused serious corruption, which threatened China’s ﬁnan-
cial stability (Xie and Lu, 2005).
2.2. Impact of the banking system reform on budget constraints
Before 2003, China’s ﬁnancial market reform mainly served the development of the capital market and did
not display characteristics of independence and marketization. The dual soft budget constraint and rent-seek-
ing behavior led state-owned commercial banks to the edge of “technical bankruptcy” (Xie and Lu, 2005). The
Chinese government responded with a new round of ﬁnancial reforms at the end of 2003 that involved the
following aspects. (1) Capital injection and ﬁnancial restructuring – at the end of 2003 and beginning of
2004, the Bank of China and the China Construction Bank received injections of US$22.5 billion and
US$45 billion, respectively, of foreign exchange reserves and sold US$278.7 billion of suspicious bad assets
to Xinda Assets Management Companies. On November 6, 2008, Central Huijin Investment injected
US$19 billion into the Agriculture Bank of China. In April 2005, Central Huijin Investment injected
US$15 billion into the China Industrial and Commercial Bank. By 2005, the proportion of non-performing
loans of these banks had fallen to below 5% and their capital adequacy ratio had reached the 8% required
by the Basel New Capital Accord (Basel II) of 2006. (2) Corporate governance system improvement – accord-
ing to “Guidance on the Corporate Management of Joint-stock Commercial Banks” released by the People’s
Bank of China in June 2002, “Guidance on the Corporation Governance Reform and Supervision of Bank of
China and China Construction Bank” released by the China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2004 and
“Guidance on the Corporation Governance Reform and Supervision of Stated-owned Commercial Banks”
released in April 2006, the three banks set up a corporate governance structure and introduced international
investment banks as strategic investors to optimize the shareholding structure. (3) Exchange listings – after a
series of capital injections, ﬁnancial restructuring and the issuance of new shares, China Construction Bank
listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on October 27, 2005; the Bank of China listed on the Hong Kong
Stock Exchange on June 1, 2006 and on the Shanghai Stock Exchange on July 5 of that year, and the China
Industrial and Commercial Bank listed on both the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges on October
27, 2006. The Agricultural Bank of China Co., Ltd. was established on January 16, 2009 and listed on the
Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Exchanges on July 15 and 16 of that year, respectively. (4) Financial legal
system construction – to ensure the smooth reform of the ﬁnancial system, the sixth meeting of the NPC
Standing Committee promulgated the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on the People’s Bank of China
(Revised)”, the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Commercial Banks (Revised)” and the “Banking
Supervision Law of the People’s Republic of China.” The three laws were executed in early 2004. The People’s
Bank of China and the China Banking Regulatory Commission either individually or jointly issued nearly 60
regulations and guidelines in 2004.
Wu and Bai (2009) ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial system reform at the end of 2003 signiﬁcantly tightened budget
constraints, but due to the mandatory nature of the reform the economic system retained automaticity during
the reform period (Aoki and Okuno, 2005). Xue and Zhu (2010) note that the ﬁnancial reform, bound by the
cost–beneﬁt balance of state-owned banks and enterprises, has not alleviated banking corruption.3 There were widespread problems in the restructuring of state-owned enterprises and borrowers diverted and embezzled their debt in the
weak legal environment, harming creditors’ interests.
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constraints and banking corruption in China’s ﬁnancial market. After the reform, the soft budget constraints
were eased, but the rent-seeking behavior of banks was not totally resolved. Thus, it is particularly important
to study the relationships between banking reform, banking corruption and credit discrimination. This paper
focuses on two aspects of these issues: the change in the relationship between ownership and access to loans
after the ﬁnancial reform and the diﬀerence in total loans between state-owned enterprises and non-state-
owned enterprises after the ﬁnancial reform.
2.3. Impact of ﬁnancial reform on the decisions of lenders and borrowers: Hypothesis 1
It has been proved that earnings quality has a signiﬁcantly negative inﬂuence on the cost of capital (Francis
et al., 2002, 2003, 2005; Chow, 2008). According to the foregoing analysis, the mandatory reform was trig-
gered not only by government, but also by the urgent need for the development of the ﬁnancial market at this
stage. In the long run, market-oriented resource allocation is not only needed by listed companies and com-
mercial banks, but is also a fundamental way to improve the eﬃciency of resource allocation. After the reform,
along with the improvement of the legal environment, the quality of accounting information became more
important to credit resource allocation. This is summarized as hypothesis 1.
H1. The banking reform enhanced the role of earnings quality in market-oriented credit resource allocation.2.4. Impact of ownership on the eﬀect of the banking reform: Hypothesis 2
Before the reform, state-owned enterprises did not have to pay rent because they were supported by soft
budget constraints. Further, the controlling shareholders of state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned
enterprises had diﬀerent residual claims on the ﬁrm and thus shareholders had no motive to pay rent. Man-
agers of state-owned enterprises were essentially asset exploiters and had no eﬃcient resources to pay rent. In
this case, due to the impulse of investment and credit rationing restrictions, non-state-owned enterprises
become the main entities paying rent to the commercial banks. All other things being equal, non-state-owned
enterprises that were willing to pay the rent had easier access to credit.
According to this analysis, China’s ﬁnancial market has two signiﬁcant characteristics: soft budget con-
straints and rent-seeking. Thus, if state-owned enterprises with lower earnings quality obtain more loans after
the reform, this means that government aid mechanisms have had an eﬀect, whereas if non-state-owned enter-
prises with lower earnings quality obtain more loans then they must be paying rent. According to Xue and
Zhu (2010), the reform has not really changed the nature of ownership and state-owned enterprises and com-
mercial banks have not changed their use of soft budget constraints. In the short run, there is still an institu-
tional basis for rent-seeking by banks after the reform, as non-state-owned enterprises are still the main
entities that pay rent. All other things being equal, commercial banks will loosen the restriction on the earn-
ings quality of non-state-owned enterprises. This is summarized as hypothesis 2.
H2. After the reform, commercial banks require lower earnings quality from non-state-owned enterprises
than state-owned enterprises.3. Sample, variables and descriptive analysis
3.1. Sample
Our data covers all A-share listed companies with ﬁnancial data for the period 1998–2010.4 Financial data
and other annual data were obtained from the CSMAR and WIND databases. Data on non-state-owned4 We calculate earnings quality using the direct cash ﬂow statements method. Accurate accruals data in the statement of cash ﬂows is
only available from 1998, so the initial year of our study is 1998.
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orize the major variables at the 1% and 99% levels.
We investigate the impact of the ﬁnancial reform on loan allocation to study whether the eﬀect of owner-
ship on loan allocation changes with an institutional change. Restricted by the measurement of earnings qual-
ity, we choose listed companies in the period 2001–2003 before the reform, and divide the period of our study
of 2001–2009 at 2004 to obtain two stages, the pre-reform period from 2001 to 2003 and the post-reform per-
iod from 2005 to 2009.
3.2. Variables
(1) Bank loans
We use new short-term loans (Dls), new long-term loans (Dll) and new total loans (Dlt) to measure loan allo-
cations, where Dls equals the diﬀerence between ﬁrm i’s closing and initial short-term loan balances divided by
total assets, Dll equals the diﬀerence between ﬁrm i’s closing and initial long-term loan balances added to long-
term loans of a maturity of less than 1 year divided by total assets, and Dlt equals the sum of Dls and Dll.
(2) Earnings quality
We use the modiﬁed Dechow–Dichev (2002, hereafter DD) measure to capture the quality attribute of main
operating proﬁts. We calculate 2001–2009 accrual quality using the relevant accounting information for roll-
ing 5-year windows during 1998–2010:5 Th
extrao
tax CFTCAi;t
AVASSETi;t
¼ a0 þ a1 CFOBTi;t1
AVASSETi;t
þ a2 CFOBTi;t
AVASSETi;t
þ a3 CFOBTi;tþ1
AVASSETi;t
þ a4 DREVi;t
AVASSETi;t
þ a5 PPEi;t
AVASSETi;t
þ ei;twhere TCAi,t: ﬁrm i’s total current accruals in year t = (MOPi,t  CFOBTi,t)5; CFOBTi,t: cash ﬂow from oper-
ations adjusted by tax in year t = (CFOi,t  IncomeTaxReturns + IncomeTaxExpense); AVASSETi,t: ﬁrm i’s
average total assets in year t and t  1; DREVi,t: ﬁrm i’s change in revenue between year t and t  1; PPEi,t: ﬁrm
i’s gross value of property, plant and equipment in year t; EQ: the negative standard deviation of ﬁrm i’s estimated
residuals from (I) and EQ ¼ rð^ei;tÞ (large (small) values of EQ corresponding to good (poor) earnings quality).
(3) External ﬁnancing dependence
According to Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Xue and Zhu (2010), we modify external ﬁnancing dependence
to measure a ﬁrm’s external ﬁnancing requirements:EXDEPit ¼ CAPXit  CFOit1
AVASSETit
;where CAPXit: ﬁrm i’s capital expenditure in year t, which is equal to the sumof new long-term investment, ﬁxed
assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets; and CFOit  1: ﬁrm i’s lagged operating cash ﬂow in year t.
(4) Ownership
According to previous research, companies with diﬀerent ownership types have a diﬀerent loan structure.
We thus code state-owned enterprises as 0 and non-state-owned enterprises as 1.e foreign literature calculates CFO as earnings before extraordinary items less total accruals. However, data on earnings before
rdinary items is not available before 2003 in China, so we use operating proﬁt as a substitute and adjust operating cash ﬂow to pre-
O to be consistent with earnings.
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Lagsize is the natural log of ﬁrm i’s lagged total assets. Gruber and Warner (1977) and Ang et al. (1982) ﬁnd
that bankruptcy costs as a percentage of a ﬁrm’s value reduce with increasing ﬁrm size, because large ﬁrms are
more inclined to diversify, which leads to a lower risk of bankruptcy. Empirical studies also ﬁnd that leverage
is greater in large ﬁrms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Other studies suggest that small ﬁrms have higher agency
costs, a higher adverse selection cost of public ﬁnancing (Smith, 1977) and prefer short-term loans, which
means that the size and leverage of small ﬁrms may be negatively related.
Lagroe is lagged return on equity. Financing order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers and Majluf, 1984) suggests
that due to asymmetric information and transaction costs, ﬁrms prefer retained earnings when sourcing cap-
ital. Thus, a ﬁrm’s current proﬁtability is important in measuring capital structure and a ﬁrm with higher earn-
ings quality has less loans. However, trade-oﬀ theory suggests that when the marginal cost (bankruptcy costs
and agency costs between shareholders and creditors) is equal to the marginal revenue (tax shields to decrease
the constraints of cash ﬂow and the information cost relative to equity ﬁnancing) of debt ﬁnancing, the ﬁrm
maximizes its value and a ﬁrm with a higher proﬁtability has more loans. Gonzalez and Gonzalez (2008) state
that in countries with weak property rights protection, ﬁrms face higher external ﬁnancing costs and follow
ﬁnancing order theory, although trade-oﬀ theory is more suitable in countries with good property rights
protection.
Laglev is the lagged ratio of debt to total assets. Morris (1992) ﬁnds that long-term loans help ﬁrms to post-
pone bankruptcy, thus overleveraged ﬁrms prefer long-term loans. Stohs and Mauer (1996) suggest that a high
ratio of long-term loans helps to increase a ﬁrm’s value. Leland and Toft (1996) show that a ﬁrm’s leverage
depends on its debt maturity, where ﬁrms with a lower asset–liability ratio access short-term loans more easily.
Dennis et al. (2000) found that a ﬁrm’s leverage has a close relationship with debt maturity. Others studies ﬁnd
that ﬁrms with a lower asset–liability ratio have to pay more cash in the future and face higher liquidity risk.
Laggrow is the lagged sales growth rate. A ﬁrm with higher growth opportunities has more ﬂexibility in its
future investment, and managers may choose investment projects that beneﬁt shareholders but harm creditors.Table 1
Variable deﬁnitions.
Variable Deﬁnition
Dls Diﬀerence between the closing and initial short-term loan balances divided by total assets
Dll Diﬀerence between the closing and initial long-term loan balances plus long-term loans of a maturity of less than 1 year divided
by total assets
Dlt The sum of Dls and Dll
Soe A dummy variable that is coded 0 if the company is a state-owned enterprise, and 1 if the company is a non-state-owned
enterprise
Eq The negative standard deviation of ﬁrm i’s estimated residuals from a regression of current accruals on lagged, current and
future cash ﬂows from operations
Rerform A dummy variable that is coded 0 if an observation occurs in the period 2001–2003 and 1 if it is in the period 2005–2009
Exdep The diﬀerence between current capital expenditure and lagged operating cash ﬂow divided by average total assets
Lagsize Natural log of ﬁrm i’s lagged total assets
Lagroe Lagged return on equity
Laglev Lagged ratio of debt to total assets
Laggrow Lagged sales growth rate
Lagﬁx Lagged ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets
Indus1 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company belongs to the public utilities industry and 0 otherwise
Indus2 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company belongs to the real estate industry and 0 otherwise
Indus3 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company belongs to a comprehensive industry and 0 otherwise
Indus4 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company belongs to an industrial industry and 0 otherwise
Distr1 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company is located in northern China and 0 otherwise
Distr2 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company is located in northeastern China and 0 otherwise
Distr3 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company is located in central China and 0 otherwise
Distr4 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company is located in eastern China and 0 otherwise
Distr5 A dummy variable that is coded 1 if a company is located in southern China and 0 otherwise
Table 2
Descriptive statistics before and after ﬁnancial reform.
Pre-reform Post-reform T-test Wilcoxon
Mean Median Mean Median
Dls 0.0199 0.0145 0.0121 0.0000 8.41 <.0001 11.70 0.0000
Dll 0.0196 0.0000 0.0211 0.0000 0.61 0.5429 0.09 0.9266
Dlt 0.0395 0.0306 0.0092 0.0029 6.03 <.0001 9.60 0.0000
Eq 0.0518 0.0262 0.0592 0.0298 2.85 0.0044 2.54 0.0110
Exdep 0.0249 0.0258 0.0363 0.0413 1.36 0.1732 4.34 0.0000
Lagsize 20.9218 20.8928 21.2871 21.3073 11.98 <.0001 13.02 0.0000
Lagroe 0.0009 0.0641 0.0316 0.0533 0.38 0.7060 0.93 0.3530
Laglev 0.5054 0.4751 0.6803 0.5536 4.38 <.0001 12.20 0.0000
Laggrow 0.0672 0.0410 0.0302 0.0559 0.96 0.3374 2.83 0.0046
Lagﬁx 0.3329 0.3121 0.3229 0.2965 1.78 0.0748 2.59 0.0097
N 1735 1735 3382 3382
Table 3
Descriptive statistics for state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises before and after the ﬁnancial reform.
Non-state-owned State-owned T-test Wilcoxon
Mean Median Mean Median
Panel A: Descriptive statistics before the ﬁnancial reform
Dls 0.0235 0.0643 0.0197 0.0228 0.56 0.5746 2.25 0.0248
Dll 0.0248 0.0000 0.0194 0.0000 1.35 0.1762 0.21 0.8300
Dlt 0.0483 0.0285 0.0391 0.0429 1.17 0.2415 2.59 0.0096
Eq 0.0746 0.0239 0.0436 0.0355 7.11 <.0001 7.49 0.0000
Exdep 0.0265 0.0263 0.0229 0.0234 0.40 0.6860 0.42 0.6753
Lagsize 20.4776 21.0083 21.0630 20.5215 12.52 <.0001 11.80 0.0000
Lagroe 0.0461 0.0641 0.0271 0.0614 0.77 0.4419 1.12 0.2631
Laglev 0.5549 0.4583 0.4797 0.5167 3.80 0.0002 4.99 0.0000
Laggrow 0.0514 0.0453 0.0707 0.0268 1.42 0.1547 2.94 0.0033
Lagﬁx 0.2983 0.3298 0.3489 0.2726 5.02 <.0001 5.01 0.0000
N 448 1287
Panel B: Descriptive statistics after the ﬁnancial reform
Dls 0.0387 0.0005 0.0005 0.0000 7.34 <.0001 6.97 <.0001
Dll 0.0177 0.0000 0.0231 0.0000 1.48 0.1399 1.27 0.1016
Dlt 0.0204 0.0000 0.0225 0.0101 5.98 <.0001 4.98 <.0001
Eq 0.0866 0.0358 0.0476 0.0245 11.15 <.0001 11.14 <.0001
Exdep 0.0549 0.6839 0.0268 0.5436 2.17 0.0302 1.55 0.0603
Lagsize 20.6747 20.9211 21.5328 21.4864 2.72 0.0065 19.44 <.0001
Lagroe 0.0522 0.0588 0.0650 0.0575 21.03 <.0001 2.97 0.0015
Laglev 0.9746 0.5391 0.5683 0.5326 0.93 0.3507 9.14 <.0001
Laggrow 0.0278 0.0590 0.0530 0.0692 6.29 <.0001 7.69 <.0001
Lagﬁx 0.2765 0.2681 0.3468 0.3248 1.28 0.2012 9.12 <.0001
N 957 2425
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positively related to growth and long-term loans will be negatively related to investment. However, Titman
and Wessels (1988) consider that growth is the added value of ﬁrm’s assets and cannot be collateral or create
tax revenue.
Lagﬁx is the lagged ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets. Scott (1972) and Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest
that managers may beneﬁt from selling collateral and the more managers can use collateral assets, the more
opportunistic their behavior. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) suggest that in a ﬁrm with higher
leverage, managers are more likely to invest in projects that may harm creditors. Collateral helps to restrict
borrowers from investing in higher risk projects and manager’s non-pecuniary compensation demands may
lead to a positive relationship between collateral and debt levels.
Table 4
Impact of the banking system reform on loan allocation.
Dls Dll Dlt
Intercept 0.0427 0.0603** 0.1030**
(1.14) (2.33) (2.12)
Eq 0.0784** 0.0689*** 0.0095
(2.10) (2.65) (0.19)
Reform 0.0217*** 0.0048 0.0170***
(4.97) (1.57) (2.98)
Eq  reform 0.0806* 0.0596** 0.1402**
(1.86) (1.98) (2.49)
Exdep 0.1591*** 0.1114*** 0.2705***
(18.36) (18.50) (24.01)
Lagsize 0.0032* 0.0033*** 0.0065***
(1.81) (2.68) (2.83)
Lagroe 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(0.34) (0.33) (0.09)
Laglev 0.0212*** 0.0008 0.0204***
(16.12) (0.92) (11.91)
Laggrow 0.0254*** 0.0175*** 0.0429***
(13.53) (13.38) (17.56)
Lagﬁx 0.0346*** 0.0300*** 0.0647***
(3.85) (4.80) (5.53)
Distr Yes Yes Yes
Indus Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-Sq 0.1787 0.0682 0.1786
F 87.04*** 29.97*** 87.03***
N 5117 5117 5117
The T-statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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and Lu, 2005)6 as control variables. Table 1 presents the deﬁnitions of the variables.
3.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables in the analysis before and after the ﬁnancial reform.
The mean and median values of new short-term loans (Dls) decrease signiﬁcantly after the ﬁnancial reform.
The mean value of Dls decreases from 0.0199 to 0.0121, and the median value decreases from 0.0145 to
0. The mean and median values of new long-term loans (Dll) also decrease after the ﬁnancial reform, with
the median value decreasing signiﬁcantly. Inﬂuenced by new short-term loans and new long-term loans, the
mean and median values of new total loans also decrease signiﬁcantly after the ﬁnancial reform.
After the reform, the mean and median values of earnings quality (Eq) decrease signiﬁcantly from 0.0518
and 0.0262 to 0.0592 and 0.0298, respectively. The mean and median values of external ﬁnancial depen-
dence (Exdep) decrease signiﬁcantly from 0.0249 and 0.0258 to 0.0363 and 0.0413, respectively. After
the reform, size and leverage are signiﬁcantly higher and growth and ﬁxed assets are signiﬁcantly lower. These
statistical results indicate that after the reform, the external ﬁnancing of ﬁrms was signiﬁcantly lower, with
fewer loans, especially short-term loans. This indicates that short-term loans are more vulnerable to the impact
of external environmental ﬂuctuations.
Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables for state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises
before and after the ﬁnancial reform. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics before the reform and Panel B6 The National Banking corruption index is 4.17. The index for northern China is 4.97, for western China is 4.71, for central China is
4.39, for southern China is 4.05, for northeastern China is 3.70 and for eastern China is 3.07 (Xie and Lu, 2005).
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term loans (Dls) for state-owned enterprises are signiﬁcantly lower than for non-state-owned enterprises. The
values of new long-term loans and new total loans for state-owned enterprises are also lower than that for
non-state-owned enterprises. This statistical result indicates that before the reform, short-term loans and
long-term loans were complementary. The mean and median values of earnings quality (Eq) of state-owned
enterprises are signiﬁcantly higher than those of non-state-owned enterprises. There is an insigniﬁcant diﬀer-
ence in the external ﬁnancial dependence (Exdep) of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises.
Post-reform, the values of new short-term loans and new total loans of state-owned enterprises is signiﬁ-
cantly higher than that of non-state-owned enterprises. There is an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence in long-term loans
between state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises, which means that soft budget constraints are still in
force after the reform. The mean and median values of earnings quality (Eq) of state-owned enterprises are
still signiﬁcantly higher than those of non-state-owned enterprises. There is still an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence
in the external ﬁnancial dependence (Exdep) of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises. This result indi-
cates that the earnings quality of state-owned enterprises is signiﬁcantly higher during 2001–2009 than that of
non-state-owned enterprises, and thus the reform has signiﬁcantly improved the short-term credit market.4. Results
4.1. Impact of the banking system reform on loan allocation
We use model (1) to analyze the variance in the impact of earnings quality on loan allocation between state-
owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises:Table 5
Impact of the banking system reform on loan allocation to state-owned enterprises.
Dls Dll Dlt
Intercept 0.0604* 0.0780*** 0.1384***
(1.77) (3.02) (3.23)
Eq 0.0438 0.1109*** 0.0671
(1.06) (3.53) (1.29)
Reform 0.0134*** 0.0057* 0.0077
(3.41) (1.92) (1.56)
Eq  reform 0.1541*** 0.0701* 0.2242***
(3.23) (1.94) (3.75)
Exdep 0.1267*** 0.1457*** 0.2724***
(13.62) (20.69) (23.37)
Lagsize 0.0034** 0.0036*** 0.0070***
(2.10) (2.97) (3.47)
Lagroe 0.0003 0.0013** 0.0011
(0.37) (2.52) (1.22)
Laglev 0.0111*** 0.0019 0.0092***
(5.37) (1.20) (3.55)
Laggrow 0.0238*** 0.0272*** 0.0510***
(11.70) (17.62) (19.98)
Lagﬁx 0.0418*** 0.0454*** 0.0872***
(5.28) (7.59) (8.80)
Distr Yes Yes Yes
Indus Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-Sq 0.1095 0.1164 0.1710
F 36.22*** 38.87*** 60.12***
N 3712 3712 3712
The T-statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
sÞ
Table 6
Impact of the banking system reform on loan allocation to non-state-owned enterprises.
Dls Dll Dlt
Intercept 0.1428 0.0043 0.1471
(1.34) (0.06) (1.04)
Eq 0.1624** 0.0228 0.1396
(2.21) (0.47) (1.43)
Reform 0.0401*** 0.0020 0.0381**
(3.36) (0.25) (2.40)
Eq  reform 0.0400 0.0434 0.0034
(0.47) (0.77) (0.03)
Exdep 0.3493*** 0.1434*** 0.4928***
(15.25) (9.45) (16.20)
Lagsize 0.0044 0.0013 0.0030
(0.86) (0.40) (0.45)
Lagroe 0.0004 0.0013* 0.0017
(0.33) (1.82) (1.16)
Laglev 0.0290*** 0.0019 0.0308***
(13.18) (1.27) (10.56)
Laggrow 0.0063 0.0028 0.0090
(1.35) (0.91) (1.47)
Lagﬁx 0.0294 0.0000 0.0294
(1.13) (0.00) (0.85)
Distr Yes Yes Yes
Indus Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-Sq 0.2810 0.0622 0.2527
F 43.56*** 8.22*** 37.83***
N 1405 1405 1405
The T-statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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ð1ÞTable 4 reports the results of model (1) testing the variance in the impact of earnings quality on loan allo-
cation before and after the reform. We ﬁnd that before the reform earnings quality has a signiﬁcant positive
inﬂuence on new short-term loans and a signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence on new long-term loans, which due to
the substitutability of soft budget constraints means that earnings quality has no signiﬁcant inﬂuence on new
total loans. After the reform, the strength of the positive relationship between earnings quality and loans
increases. The results in Table 4 indicate that the banking system reform has improved the eﬃciency of ﬁnan-
cial resource allocation and that earnings quality has had an incremental inﬂuence on credit loans.
Table 5 reports the results of model (1) testing the impact of state-owned enterprises’ earnings quality on
loan allocation before and after the reform. After the reform, the positive relationship between the earnings
quality of state-owned enterprises and new short-term loans, new long-term loans and new total loans is
enhanced. The results in Table 5 indicate that the banking system reform has improved credit allocation
and tightened budget constraints.
Table 6 reports the results of model (1) testing the impact of the earnings quality of non-state-owned enter-
prises on loan allocation before and after the reform. After the reform, the relationship between the earnings
quality of non-state-owned enterprise and new short-term loans, new long-term loans and new total loans does
not change signiﬁcantly. Combined with the results in Table 5, the reform appears to have had a greater
impact on state-owned enterprises than non-state-owned enterprises, which provides preliminary evidence
to verify Hypothesis 2.
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To further analyze the impact of the banking system reform on ﬁnancial resource allocation, we include the
Soe ownership variable (equal to 1 for non-state-owned enterprises) in our model:DlsðDll=DltÞ ¼ f ðEq;Reform; Soe;Eq Reform;Reform  Soe;Eq  Soe;Eq Reform
 Soe;Exdep;Lagsize;Lagroe;Laglev;Laggrow;Lagfix;Distr; IndusÞ ð2ÞTable 7 reports the impact of ownership on the eﬀect of the banking system reform. When the ownership
variable is included, the impact of the reform on credit resources becomes signiﬁcantly negative and the post-
reform impact of the interaction between earnings quality and ownership on short-term loans, long-term loans
and total loans is 0.2, 0.0232, and 0.2233. This means that the eﬀect of the banking system reform on
earnings quality has been lower in non-state-owned enterprises than in state-owned enterprises. These results
show that commercial banks and non-state-owned enterprises have not reduced their rent-seeking since the
reform.
The foregoing results are reported with White-adjusted standard errors. We also conducted several addi-
tional tests. We repeated the tests using the Jones model (Jones, 1991), substituting earnings predictabilityTable 7
Impact of ownership on the eﬀect of the banking system reform.
Dls Dll Dlt
Intercept 0.0320 0.0773*** 0.1093**
(0.82) (2.84) (2.15)
Eq 0.0239 0.0965** 0.0727
(0.44) (2.55) (1.03)
Reform 0.0107** 0.0055 0.0052
(2.09) (1.55) (0.78)
Soe 0.0196** 0.0112** 0.0307***
(2.42) (1.99) (2.93)
Eq  reform 0.1743*** 0.0647 0.2390***
(2.83) (1.51) (2.98)
Reform  soe 0.0370*** 0.0048 0.0418***
(3.89) (0.73) (3.38)
Eq  soe 0.1256* 0.0594 0.1850**
(1.75) (1.19) (1.99)
Eq  reform  soe 0.2000** 0.0232 0.2233**
(2.57) (0.43) (2.20)
Exdep 0.1576*** 0.1121*** 0.2697***
(18.18) (18.59) (23.92)
Lagsize 0.0025 0.0039*** 0.0064***
(1.35) (3.08) (2.69)
Lagroe 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
(0.39) (0.34) (0.12)
Laglev 0.0217 0.0010 0.0206***
(16.29) (1.13) (11.92)
Laggrow 0.0250*** 0.0176*** 0.0427***
(13.32) (13.48) (17.45)
Lagﬁx 0.0321*** 0.0322*** 0.0643***
(3.54) (5.10) (5.44)
Distr Yes Yes Yes
Indus Yes Yes Yes
Adj R-Sq 0.181 0.069 0.1799
F 67.86*** 23.40*** 67.35***
N 5117 5117 5117
The T-statistics are in parentheses.
* Signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
** Signiﬁcance at the 5% level.
*** Signiﬁcance at the 10% level.
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the cash-ﬂow statement as total loans and using the sample year 2001 only. In addition, we repeated the tests
using Tobin’s Q to measure a ﬁrm’s growth opportunities, ROA to measure a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and the nat-
ural logarithm of total sales to measure size. The results do not change in any of these additional tests and we
do not report them due to space limitations.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates credit allocation before and after the 2003 banking system reform to analyze the
interactive inﬂuence of government, commercial banks, state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enter-
prises on credit allocation. We ﬁnd that the banking system reform has enhanced the role of earnings quality
in the credit markets and eased the budget constraints of state-owned enterprises. Further analysis implies
that, due to the inﬂuence of rent-seeking, banks have relaxed the earnings requirements of non-state-owned
listed companies.
The practical implication of these ﬁndings is that improving credit allocation eﬃciency is not a matter of a
simple policy choice, but is the result of institutional design. In the long run, further research is needed on the
game theory of government, commercial banks, state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises in
light of the stock-liquidity reform and the deeper ﬁnancial system reform, with a focus on the inﬂuence of gov-
ernment governance on credit allocation.
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